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Michael Dummett's most recent book, published originally in Italian in 2001, is 
something of a survey of the general themes of his philosophical career.  It touches on 
the clarificatory ambitions of philosophy, the centrality to the analytic tradition of the 
linguistic turn, the importance of Frege to the tradition, the prospects of a global anti-
realism, the priority of semantic issues in debates over realism, and the dangers of 
analytic scientism to a rapprochement between the analytic and continental philosophical 
traditions.  Dummett's views on each of these subjects are broadly repeated from his 
classic works on anti-realism, Frege and the history of the analytic tradition, and 
students of Dummett will find here echoes, rather than amplifications, of that more 
rigorous material -- evocations of famous arguments and views from 'Truth', 'The Reality 
of the Past', 'The Philosophical Foundations of Intuitionistic Logic', The Logical Basis of 
Metaphysics and Dummett's interpretative works on Frege.  Nor does the book provide 
much of an update of Dummett's philosophical position.  In other work from the period in 
which this book was originally published, Dummett makes important concessions and 
restatements of his view with respect to -- for instance -- the knowability principle, or 
the prospects of an anti-realism about time.  Here there are no such subtleties on show. 
What does give the present work some novelty for Dummett's general 
philosophical audience are some of the digressions made along the way -- his discussion 
of the relationship between philosophy and religion, the role of the philosopher of faith, a 
rather curious discussion of Gadamer's views on understanding, and sketches of an 
argument for the existence of God.  On the whole, these passages concern the 
boundaries and possibilities of the analytic tradition, and perhaps the greatest value of 
the book is as an assessment of Dummett's views on this issue.  In this short review, we 
will look at Dummett's claims regarding the split between the analytic and the 
continental traditions that he invokes on the issue of language and meaning, and detail 
some of his thoughts on philosophy's divided house more generally.  
In Truth and Other Enigmas, Dummett set out a conception of the analytic tradition that 
he has generally remained faithful to: 
Only with Frege was the proper object of philosophy finally established: namely, 
first, that the goal of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of thought; 
secondly, that the study of thought is to be sharply distinguished from the study 
of the psychological process of thinking; and, finally, that the only proper method 
for analysing thought consists in the analysis of language…  The acceptance of 
these three tenets is common to the entire analytical school (458).  
Many critics have pointed out that this characterization -- even with Dummett's later 
elaborations -- fails to distinguish analytic philosophy from, say Derridian deconstruction, 
and also, as Dummett himself admits, fails to include those analytics (such as Gareth 
Evans) who invert the explanatory order here. Yet Dummett's credo does pick out the 
key features of a large and important tract of analytic philosophy that does genuinely 
differ from almost all continental philosophy. In his earlier texts, Dummett has generally 
contrasted this Fregean/Russellian analytic tradition with the work of Husserl to make 
the point; Dummett's recent book instead contrasts it with a Heideggerian/Gadamerian 
trajectory with respect to language and meaning.  In the two or three chapters in which 
this theme is developed, Dummett does not hide his conviction that the continentals 
come off rather more poorly in the comparison:  
Philosophers of the analytic school accept without cavail that theses about the 
logical form of sentences or other linguistic expressions are among the proper 
concerns of philosophy. Those of the type generally termed 'continental' usually 
have little interest in them… although they may extol language… they do not seek 
to analyze it or explain its workings (16).  
Now this is perhaps a bit too quick; of course, it all depends on what one means by 
analysis, and this is a topic that both traditions have rung many changes on. The 
continental tradition does, for instance, encompass decompositional and etymological 
analyses of concepts and linguistic expressions. Arguably, it is not linguistic analysis, 
loosely construed, nor the linguistic turn per se, that is absent from the continental 
tradition, but rather any kind of commitment to the systematic or compositional 
approach to language inaugurated by Frege and Russell, which has remained influential -
- though not always dominant -- within analytic philosophy ever since. Michael Beaney, 
for instance, suggests that what is distinctive about analytic philosophy is not simply an 
emphasis upon the importance of analysis, since all philosophers have done and continue 
to do analysis (including linguistic analysis), but the use of what he calls 
"transformational analysis" in which everyday language is translated into an ideal 
language (with the help of logic), before a further analysis of some other (often 
decompositional) kind.  
Arguably, this analytic interest in systematicity extends beyond a commitment to 
formal or semantic methods in the philosophy of language.  Peter Strawson is far from 
the most formally inclined analytic philosopher, but in Analysis and Metaphysics he talks 
about our daily linguistic practice, and the job of analytic philosophy, in the following 
terms: 
          Just as the… modern grammarian labours to produce a systematic account 
of the structure of rules which we effortlessly observe in speaking grammatically, 
so the philosopher labours to produce a systematic account of the general 
conceptual structure of which our daily practice shows us to have a tacit and 
unconscious mastery (2). 
As David Cooper observes, "the 'linguistic turns' taken on the continent do not permit 
this vision of philosophical inquiry consisting in, and finding its justification in, 
systematically rendering explicit rules or principles deemed to be implicitly or 
unconsciously understood or grasped by speakers" [David Copper, "Analytic and 
Continental Philosophy", Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Vol. 94, 1994, p13.]. 
Instead, as Cooper notes, there is rather a concern with attending to the background 
that is presupposed by the operation of any particular rules, the background conditions 
of inquiry. Apart from Habermas, there are not really any exemplars of such approaches 
to meaning in continental philosophy; rather, continental work on meaning is 
hermeneutic, or pragmatic in a fairly non-cognitivist sense. (Unsurprisingly, Chomsky 
has next to no presence in continental philosophy of language, but a significant role in 
analytic philosophy, and the situation is close to reversed in regard to the work of the 
linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. It is for related reasons that J. J. Lecercle was moved to 
comment, in a comparative essay on philosophy of language, that: "All I think I have 
achieved is to remind you of the existence of the Channel: 'meaning' on one coast, 'sens' 
on the other are rather different concepts…" J. J. Lecercle, "The Misprision of Pragmatics: 
Conceptions of Language in Contemporary French Philosophy", Contemporary French 
Philosophy, ed. A. P. Griffiths, Cambridge: CUP 1987, p.38. In this respect, also see V. 
Descombes, Objects of All Sorts: A Philosophical Grammar, Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins UP 1982.]) 
The question, of course, is which of these approaches is more philosophically 
useful or insightful, and in this respect Dummett's allegiances are clear. Dummett notes 
that Gadamer's view, in which language is broadly understood as the expression of 
meaning (and in which understanding and interpretation are central concepts), means 
that he must be prepared to apply the concept of truth to art, something that Dummett 
finds untenable (16): "to concentrate on understanding in this broader sense [instead of 
linguistic understanding as a kind of knowledge of meaning]is a mistake". Dummett 
concedes that art may alter our attitudes, enrich our emotional life, even bring us to 
recognize something as true that we had previously dismissed, "but it does not of itself 
convey knowledge. Knowledge consists in the apprehension of the truth of propositions… 
It is therefore only through the analysis of linguistic meaning that we can gain insight 
into the structure of thought. The structure of thought is the primary concern of 
philosophy, since it is in thought that we apprehend reality" (17). Such claims of course 
reveal still further divisions between the traditions. What does Dummett give to justify 
this claim? He contends that interpretation and understanding in the Gadamerian sense 
depends on the fact that sentences have meaning, and it needs to be explained how this 
is so: "If philosophy is concerned with analyzing the concepts in terms of which we think, 
it needs as a basis a conspectus of how our words combine to yield meaningful 
sentences, and thus how our concepts hang together to form fully-fledged thoughts" 
(17). Of course, for most continental philosophers this is an intellectualist dogma, and 
the meaning mystery as it is sometimes called -- how do words have meaning -- is not 
such a puzzle. Are they sticking their heads in the sand, ignoring the semantic core of 
our language, or is the Dummettian analytic philosopher preoccupied with a philosophical 
puzzle of little relevance to the world?  
Curiously, Dummett also sums up the differences here in terms of philosophical 
temperament: "From Frege we get sharp, detailed, innovative analysis; from Gadamer, 
ruminations at a high level of generality. Which approach is found more illuminating is a 
matter of temperament" (98). This somewhat relativizing remark is perhaps not a settled 
concession, as Dummett goes on to suggest "[t]here is a space, indeed a need, for 
philosophical discussion of high-level questions about language; but answers to such 
questions will be solidly based only if there is, or at least it is possible to construct, a 
credibly analytic account of how language works" (99).  
Dummett patrols other boundaries of the analytic as well; for instance, that 
between philosophy and the sciences: 
Philosophy aims to explore the structure of human thought… The scientifically 
inclined spurn philosophical reflection so conceived… They replace philosophical 
explanations with 'naturalised' versions. Such 'naturalised' theories may explain 
notions to do with meaning in terms that wholly prescind from human use of 
language in communication; they therefore deny that a theory of meaning need 
yield an account of a speaker's understanding of linguistic utterances. Or they may 
explain our having the concepts that we do in terms of their supposed evolutionary 
advantages. This is not philosophy; but it is not science either. It is the result of 
the bedazzlement of those who have undertaken one manner of intellectual enquiry 
by the successes of another. That so many philosophers of the analytic school have 
suffered this bedazzlement will be an obstacle to a reconciliation between that 
school and its rivals. (36) 
In his conclusion on the future of philosophy, however, Dummett takes a different 
line on the consequences of scientism for rapprochement between the analytic and the 
continental: "If the scientism so prevalent within present-day American philosophy is 
intensified, a breach may open up between present analytic philosophy as practiced in 
the US and as practiced in Britain and continental Europe. This in itself may help to bring 
about rapprochement between European philosophers of different traditions" (150). We 
might be inclined to ask Dummett which is it?  
Dummett's conception of philosophy of course goes beyond mere exploration of 
the structure of human thought; indeed, his conception of the relationship between 
metaphysics and the philosophy of language entails that substantive philosophical 
questions can be settled once linguistic matters are sorted out.  Indeed, Dummett 
expresses a remarkable optimism that philosophical progress will lead to the settling (in 
the affirmative) of the question of the existence of God: 
Can philosophy settle what is surely the most important question of all, whether 
there are rational grounds for believing in the existence of God? There seems to 
me every reason to think that it can, and will even do so in the lifetimes of our 
great grand-children. My own belief is that it can be positively resolved (151).  
In this book Dummett does not outline the reasons he has in mind (they would 
presumably be similar to those he gives in his Gifford Lectures, published as Thought 
and Reality, and so dependent on Dummett's own general anti-realism). The 
progressivist attitude here to philosophy would no doubt be found remarkable by many 
continental philosophers, and indeed many analytic philosophers would also be 
disinclined to adopt Dummett's optimism. 
On the whole, the aspect of this book that seems most puzzling to us is the 
impression of a man reaching out to the continental tradition without in any way moving 
his feet.  Commenting on the divide, Dummett says, "plainly, the gravest obstacle to 
communal progress in philosophy is the gulf that has opened up between different 
traditions" (149). This is a theme that is familiar from other work by Dummett, and 
there is no reason at all to doubt his sincerity.  But why, exactly, is this the gravest 
obstacle? Why can't analytic philosophy make communal progress without a sustained 
engagement with its continental (and presumably Asian) other(s)? This is not clear from 
Dummett's book. And of course, if this is the goal of philosophy for Dummett then there 
is something problematic about the appeal: most continental philosophers (but also 
Wittgenstein, Rorty, and many others) simply don't believe in philosophy as communal 
progress.  
Dummett feels that the prospects for reconciliation between analytic philosophy 
and phenomenology and hermeneutics are better than they were forty years ago (149), 
and he cites the philosophy of mind as a particularly propitious meeting place (150). To 
some extent we agree with this sentiment, but the divide Dummett traces in the 
philosophy of language recurs in the philosophy of mind. In both fields, much of the 
analytic tradition is generally committed to a kind of representationalism that coheres 
well with decompositional analytic projects.  In general this is not the case in 
phenomenology and continental philosophy of mind. Indeed, it is no coincidence that 
most of those theorists who are broadly anti-representational in their account of our 
perception and understanding of others (and are wary of folk-psychology) are 
significantly inspired by at least one of three key phenomenologists: Husserl, Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty. By contrast, in the end of analytic philosophy of mind most closely 
associated with the cognitive sciences, until recently the idea that one should explain 
intelligent behavior -- that is informational sensitivity -- by appeal to internal 
representations had the status of received truth. On this view, the well-springs of 
intelligence are fundamentally inner mechanisms of inference and discrimination in the 
brain (Wheeler 2001). Can each take the criticisms of the other seriously, such that this 
might constitute a mature dialogue between opposing views? Perhaps, but there are 
many metaphilosophical and methodological differences at stake here, and hence 
Dummett's hope for communal progress seems to us as far from fruition as ever.  
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